Using individual-level data on homeowner debt and defaults from 1997 to 2008, we show that borrowing against the increase in home equity by existing homeowners is responsible for a significant fraction of both the sharp rise in U.S. household leverage from 2002 to 2006 and the increase in defaults from 2006 to 2008. Employing land topology-based housing supply elasticity as an instrument for house price growth, we estimate that the average homeowner extracts 25 to 30 cents for every dollar increase in home equity. Money extracted from increased home equity is not used to purchase new real estate or pay down high credit card balances, which suggests that borrowed funds may be used for real outlays (i.e., consumption or home improvement). Home equity-based borrowing is stronger for younger households, households with low credit scores, and households with high initial credit card utilization rates. Homeowners in high house price appreciation areas experience a relative decline in default rates from 2002 to 2006 as they borrow heavily against their home equity, but experience very high default rates from 2006 Our central goal in this study is to investigate how existing homeowners respond to the rising value of their home equity, a channel we refer to as the home equity-based borrowing channel. This is an important question for several reasons. First, given that 65% of U.S. households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices beginning in the late 1990s, a strong home equity-based borrowing channel may be an important cause of the rapid rise in household leverage preceding the economic downturn.
European countries (Mian and Sufi (2010) and Glick and Lansing (2010) ).
One reason for the rapid expansion in household leverage during this period was that mortgage credit became more easily available to new home buyers (Mian and Sufi (2009) ).
However, strong house price appreciation from 2002 to 2006, which may have been fueled by the availability of mortgage credit to a riskier set of new home buyers, could also have had an important feedback effect on household leverage through existing homeowners.
Our central goal in this study is to investigate how existing homeowners respond to the rising value of their home equity, a channel we refer to as the home equity-based borrowing channel. This is an important question for several reasons. First, given that 65% of U.S. households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices beginning in the late 1990s, a strong home equity-based borrowing channel may be an important cause of the rapid rise in household leverage preceding the economic downturn.
Second, the quantitative strength of the home equity-based borrowing channel is theoretically ambiguous. House price appreciation may have no effect on homeowner borrowing because the increase in home equity wealth is counter-balanced with a higher cost of future housing consumption (Sinai and Souleles (2005) , Campbell and Cocco (2007) ). On the other hand, if homeowners are credit-constrained or subject to self-control issues, then house price appreciation may induce households to borrow more (Stein (1995) , Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (2006) , Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006) , and Laibson (1997) ).
Third, to the extent that homeowners use home equity-based borrowing to finance real outlays such as consumption or home improvement, a large home equity-based borrowing channel could provide a quantitative explanation for the decline in the U.S. savings rate in the decade preceding the financial crisis. More broadly, if house prices strongly affect existing homeowners' borrowing behavior, then dramatic swings in the housing market may have real effects on the economy through consumption and mortgage defaults.
We examine the home equity-based borrowing channel using a data set consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency. The agency has provided us a random sample of almost 75,000 homeowners living in every major metropolitan statistical area in the United States. We track these individuals at an annual frequency from the end of 1997 until the end of 2008. This data set allows us to separate homeowners borrowing against the rising value of their home equity from renters buying into a hot housing market.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots the growth in debt of 1997 homeowners over time, and shows that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006. While the aggregate trend is suggestive of a link, changes in house prices and homeowner borrowing may be jointly determined by an omitted variable such as a shock to expected income growth (King (1990) , Attanasio and Weber (1994) , Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) ). As a result, proper identification of the effect of house prices on borrowing requires an exogenous source of variation in house price growth.
We use two different instruments for house price growth, one based on across-MSA variation and another based on within-MSA variation. The across-MSA specification uses housing supply elasticity at the MSA level as an instrument for house prices. MSAs with elastic housing supply should experience only modest increase in house prices in response to large shifts in the demand for housing because housing supply can be expanded relatively easily. In contrast, inelastic housing supply MSAs should experience large house price changes in response to the same housing demand shock (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) ).
We confirm this relationship in our data using the land-topology based measure of housing supply elasticity introduced by Saiz (2010) . Using this instrument, the across-MSA instrumental variables estimate uncovers a large home equity-based borrowing channel. Our preferred estimate suggests an elasticity of borrowing with respect to increased home equity of 0.50. Alternatively, we find that households borrow 25 to 30 cents on each additional dollar of home equity from 2002 to 2006.
An obvious concern with the IV estimates is that MSAs with an inelastic supply of housing could also experience differential non-house price-related credit demand shocks. A number of tests mitigate this concern however. First, the borrowing patterns in elastic and inelastic MSAs closely track each other until 2002 when housing prices accelerated. Second, there is almost no difference in measures of non-house price credit demand shocks such as income, payroll, and employment growth between inelastic and elastic MSAs during this period.
Third, our results are insensitive to non-parametric controls for changes in credit demand driven by individual income, credit score, age, and sex. Fourth, we find no statistically significant difference in the growth of credit card balances for homeowners living in inelastic versus elastic MSAs. This finding suggests that the home equity borrowing channel, and not a general shift in credit demand, is driving our basic result. Finally, there is no difference in the borrowing behavior of renters between elastic and inelastic MSAs.
Our second instrument for house price growth exploits within-MSA variation and uses the interaction of the 1997 fraction of subprime borrowers in a zip code with MSA level housing supply inelasticity as an instrument for house price growth. The instrument is motivated by Mian and Sufi (2009) who show that an expansion of mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005 is associated with stronger house price appreciation in subprime zip codes compared to prime zip codes, despite relatively declining income opportunities for subprime areas. Furthermore, as theory would suggest, the differential house price appreciation in subprime zip codes is present only in inelastic housing supply MSAs. The interaction of the 1997 share of subprime population in a zip code with MSA level housing supply inelasticity therefore serves as an instrument for within-MSA house price growth.
1 Our within-MSA estimates are similar to the across-MSA estimates.
The real effects of the home equity-based borrowing channel depend on what households do with the borrowed money. We find little evidence that borrowing in response to increased house prices is used to purchase new homes or investment properties. We also find no evidence that home equity-based borrowing is used to pay down credit card balances, even for households in the highest quartile of the 1997 credit card utilization distribution. This finding suggests that the marginal return to the use of borrowed funds is higher to households than the high interest rate on credit card debt. While we do not have data on real outlays, these findings suggest that consumption and home improvement are possible uses of the increased borrowing.
We use our microeconomic estimates to calculate the aggregate impact of the home equity-based borrowing channel. We find that a total of $1.45 trillion of the rise in household debt from 2002 to 2006 is attributable to existing homeowners borrowing against the increased value of their homes. This translates to 2.8% of GDP per year. This is a conservative lowerbound estimate given that it is based on a difference-in-differences estimator that ignores any level effect of house prices on borrowing.
Given the large effect of house prices on homeowner borrowing, which model of household behavior is consistent with our estimates? We explore cross-sectional heterogeneity in 1 See Section II.C for more on the within-MSA triple-difference identification strategy.
the effect to explore this question. We find that homeowners with high credit card utilization rates and low credit scores at the beginning of the sample have the strongest tendency to borrow against increases in home equity. In fact, we find no effect of house prices on borrowing for homeowners in the top quartile of credit score distribution as of 1997. We also find that the home-equity based borrowing channel is stronger for younger homeowners. We find no evidence of a differential effect based on either income or gender.
These results are consistent with a model of credit constraints under the assumption that low credit scores and high credit card utilization rates serve as indicators for borrowing difficulty. However, these characteristics may also proxy for individuals with self-control problems. Our finding that older individuals have a smaller home equity-based borrowing channel is inconsistent with standard life cycle-based models.
The increase in homeowner leverage due to the home equity-based borrowing channel plays an important role in the ensuing financial crisis. Using homeowner default rate data, we
show that borrowing against rising home equity is accompanied by a relative decline in default The reversal is especially strong among low credit score and high credit card utilization homeowners who most aggressively borrow against rising home equity during the housing boom.
Our findings are related to research on the effect of house price growth on consumption, refinancing, and borrowing behavior (Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) , Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009) , Lehnert (2004) , Haurin and Rosenthal (2006) , Hurst and Stafford (2004) , Campbell and Cocco (2007) , Greenspan and Kennedy (2007), Cooper (2009) ). Our results complement this research by using a novel data set and a novel empirical strategy to isolate the effect of house prices on borrowing. We believe that the empirical strategy we utilize is of firstorder importance given that house prices, borrowing behavior, and consumption are likely jointly driven by unobservable permanent income shocks. In addition, we are the first in this literature to examine default behavior as it relates to home equity-based borrowing.
These issues are important given that declines in housing and durable consumption often precede economic recessions. Leamer (2008) points out that eight of the ten post-World War II recessions were preceded by a decline in housing and durable consumption. The current recession is no different. Understanding the links between housing and the real economy necessitates a better understanding of the way homeowners respond to fluctuating asset prices.
Our analysis provides microeconomic estimates on homeowners' response to increased house values and the macroeconomic effect of the home equity-based borrowing channel. Our findings are therefore related to models in which housing plays a crucial role in the macroeconomy (Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe (2004) , Iacoviello (2005) , Jeske and Krueger (2005) , Iacoviello and Manetti (2008), and Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Niewerburgh (2009) ).
The rest of our study proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data and summary statistics. Sections II through V present results, and Section VI concludes.
I. Data and Summary Statistics

A. Data
The final data set used in our analysis consists of detailed credit report information from The rate of homeownership among individuals in the credit report data (42%) is significantly lower than the fraction of households that own their primary residence in census data (65%). We believe that this difference is driven by the fact that our measures are for individuals, not for households. As a result, individuals with no current or previous mortgage debt that live in a home in which some other individual has mortgage debt will not be counted as a homeowner. In addition, any homeowner with no previous or current mortgage debt outstanding will be excluded in our definition of homeownership.
There are 88,784 homeowners in our sample. The final restriction we make is to exclude homeowners that move from their 1997 zip code between 1997 and 1999. Approximately 15% of homeowners move within the first two years of our sample, at which point the fraction that moves levels off significantly. We exclude these "transient" individuals since we want to ensure that when the house price shock hits, the homeowners are living in the zip code we assign them to initially. This leaves a final sample of 74,149 individuals in 2,307 zip codes located in 68
MSAs.
Due to restrictions on the dissemination of individual credit report information, Equifax only provides us data on these homeowners in groups of at least five individuals. We are free to sort the data in any way before the groups are formed. The primary data-sort that we utilize sorts homeowners by their 1997 zip code and then by their 1997 credit score before groups are formed. This ensures that our unit of observation, a group of 5 homeowners on average, is as homogenous as possible on observed characteristics. In a few tests where we estimate heterogeneity of our main effect, we re-sort the data to maximize available variation along the dimension of interest. For example, we re-sort data by zip code and then age when testing whether young homeowners behave differently than old homeowners.
We augment the individual level data with several additional data sets. We use the following zip code level time-varying sources of data: house price data from FCSW, IRS income data, employment and payroll information from the Census Business Statistics, aggregate consumer credit score data from Equifax. All of these additional data sets are described in detail in the appendix of Mian and Sufi (2009 Mian and Sufi (2009) that we use is the fraction of all consumers in a zip code with a "subprime" credit score, which is defined to be a score below 660 as of 1997. In our sample, homeowners on average live in a zip code with 31% subprime consumers.
B. Summary Statistics
II. The Effect of House Prices on Home Equity-Based Borrowing
A. Theoretical Motivation
How should an individual homeowner respond to an increase in their house price, all else being equal? This is the thought experiment that our empirical specification attempts to implement using instruments for house price growth. The theoretical answer to this question depends on the underlying model of consumer behavior.
A useful starting benchmark is unconstrained long-lived homeowners. These homeowners plan on using housing consumption in the foreseeable future, perhaps due to bequest motives, and are not credit-constrained when choosing their consumption paths. Sinai and Souleles (2005) and Campbell and Cocco (2007) show that such households are naturally hedged against house price fluctuations in the absence of credit constraints or substitution effects. Any increase in house prices makes future housing consumption more expensive. As a result, the propensity to borrow out of housing gains is zero.
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A second possible model is based on short-lived homeowners who do not value housing bequests very highly and plan on consuming part of their housing capital before death. Such homeowners would like to borrow against unexpected increases in home equity to finance consumption, with the propensity to borrow being strongest for older homeowners with shorter life horizons.
A third possibility is credit-constrained homeowners who want to borrow more today to smooth consumption over time, but are unable to do so due to limited collateral. Such 6 An important caveat is a situation in which homeowners have short expected tenure or a high probability of moving. In this case, a relative house price shock may be treated as a real wealth shock.
homeowners would borrow more against increases in home equity to relax their budget constraints (Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (2006) , Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, (2006) ). Finally following Laibson (1997) , homeowners with limited self-control may aggressively borrow against increased access to housing wealth in order to finance current consumption.
B. Across MSA Empirical Strategy Based on Housing Supply Inelasticity
Our empirical strategy is designed to estimate the effect of house prices on home equitybased borrowing. As the aggregate data in Figure 1 show, there is a strong correlation between house price growth and homeowner debt growth. However, it is possible that omitted time varying factors drive both house prices and borrowing behavior. Perhaps the most worrisome time-varying trend is changes in productivity or permanent income.
Our first empirical test exploits variation across MSAs in housing supply elasticity. The intuition of the tests is straightforward: for an equivalent housing demand shock, the slope of the housing supply curve determines that degree to which housing prices rise in an area. The insight of Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) is that this basic prediction holds under most models of house price evolution. As long as builders respond to house prices, an increase in housing supply puts an upper bound on house price appreciation in elastic housing supply MSAs.
In the top panel of Figure An alternative IV specification using the debt to income ratio also shows a positive effect of house prices on leverage. The estimate of 1.5 in column 6 implies that a one standard deviation change in house prices leads to a 1/4 standard deviation increase in the debt to income ratio. As with the elasticity measures, the effect of house prices on debt to income ratios is completely insensitive to individual level controls (columns 7 and 8), and only slightly sensitive to zip code level demographics and income patterns (column 9).
Figure 3 presents the non-parametric plot of the effect of house price growth on debt growth across the full distribution. It shows the second stage of the IV estimate in column 2 of Table II by plotting total debt growth from 2002-2006 against predicted house price growth over the same period. As Figure 3 shows, the effect is close to linear with a slight convexity near the middle of the distribution. The pattern is also robust across almost the entire distribution, although the statistical precision is lower at the low end of the house price growth distribution.
In Table III , we present IV estimates of the effect of an increase in home equity on home borrowing in dollar units. The first stage estimate in column 1 implies that a one standard deviation decrease in housing supply elasticity leads to a $30 thousand increase in home equity.
The second stage estimates in columns 2 through 5 suggest that 1997 homeowners borrow 25 to 30 cents on every dollar of additional home equity value. As columns 3 to 5 show, the estimate is completely insensitive to both individual and zip code level control variables.
One concern with the findings in Table II , Figure 3 , and Table III is the validity of the exclusion restriction. In other words, it is possible that differential trends in inelastic and elastic
MSAs during this time period would lead to differential borrowing patterns even in the absence of differential house price growth. Of course, the robustness of our findings to a series of rigorous control variables partially mitigates this concern, but omitted factors not captured by our control variables could still be a worry.
In Table IV, and not a general increase in the demand for credit. In columns 5 and 6, we examine renters who never buy into the rising housing market during the sample period. As the estimates show, there is no statistically significant differential increase in borrowing among renters in inelastic areas.
While it is impossible to test the exclusion restriction explicitly, there is little evidence to suggest that the increased homeowner borrowing that we find in inelastic housing supply MSAs is driven by something other than house prices. The fact that the increased borrowing is concentrated in home-related debt is consistent with a home equity-based borrowing channel.
Further evidence in support of the validity of the exclusion restriction is presented in Section V where we focus on cross-sectional heterogeneity in the effect of house prices on consumer borrowing. As we show there, there is almost no differential effect for high credit score and low credit card utilization borrowers, which suggests the absence of non-housing related factors driving our results.
C. Within-MSA Empirical Strategy Based on 1997 Fraction of Subprime Borrowers
This section presents an alternative IV strategy that exploits within-MSA variation at the level of zip codes to identify the effect of house prices on homeowner borrowing. The motivation for this test comes from Mian and Sufi (2009) In columns 2 to 5 of Table V , Panel A, we replicate another finding of Mian and Sufi (2009) : the relative shift in the supply of mortgage credit for home purchase toward high subprime share zip codes occurs even in the most elastic MSAs where there is no significant house price growth. However, the shift in the supply of mortgage credit is stronger in more inelastic housing supply MSAs that experience strong house price growth. Based on these findings, Mian and Sufi (2009) argue that house price appreciation cannot fully explain the shift in the supply of mortgage credit to high subprime areas, but house price growth strengthens the effect through a collateral feedback mechanism (as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ).
Column 1 of Table V , Panel B presents evidence that the shift in the supply of credit toward subprime share zip codes leads to higher house price growth in subprime zip codes relative to prime zip codes within the same MSA. Columns 2 through 5 show that this effect is only present in inelastic MSAs, as we would expect given the intuition on house prices and supply elasticity in Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) . Mian and Sufi (2009) However, a concern with this estimate is that despite IS and IP having the same initial credit score, the fact that they live in different neighborhoods potentially makes them different on unobserved dimensions. The unobserved dimensions could also affect the borrowing decisions in a way that makes (B IS -B IP ) a biased estimate of the direct house price effect.
How does one control for the unobserved neighborhood effect of subprime versus prime neighborhoods? The triple-difference strategy exploits the additional variation in housing supply elasticity. In particular, as mentioned earlier, the difference in house prices of subprime versus prime neighborhood disappears in elastic MSAs due to easily adjustable housing supply. This idea translates into estimating the following reduced form regression equation:
, , The second stage estimates for both debt growth and the change in debt to income are presented in Table VI . The estimates from the within-MSA specification are slightly higher than the estimates from the across-MSA analysis presented in the previous sub-section. The inclusion of control variables does not change the debt growth specification estimate. However, the effect of house price growth on the change in debt to income is more sensitive to the inclusion of control variables.
The within-MSA approach in Table VI explores a different source of house price variation relative to the across-MSA approach of Table II . In econometric terms, both the across and within approaches are local average treatment effect (LATE) estimators with the "local average" computed over mutually exclusive parts of the house price distribution. Yet the two approaches produce quite consistent estimates of the effect of house prices on homeowner borrowing. It should be kept in mind that the majority of the overall house price variation is across MSAs. 7 For this reason, the across-MSA estimate is economically more meaningful, while the within-MSA estimate serves as a useful robustness check.
III. The Macroeconomic Impact of the Home Equity-Based Borrowing Channel
A. What Are Consumers Doing with Borrowed Money?
What do homeowners do with the money borrowed against home equity? The question is important in order to understand the real effects of the home equity-based borrowing channel.
For example, if home equity borrowing is used to pay down other more expensive forms of consumer credit such as credit card debt, then home equity borrowing may not have a large aggregate impact. However, if home equity-based borrowing is used primarily for consumption or home improvement, then the real and policy implications are substantial.
We first test whether high house prices lead homeowners to "trade up" by taking a bigger mortgage to move to a bigger home. Our data records the current zip code of each individual borrower. We can therefore construct an indicator variable for whether a homeowner moves from 2002 to 2006. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A in Table VII show that house price appreciation is not correlated with the probability of moving. This is true when examining the OLS specification or when using MSA housing supply inelasticity as an instrument for house price growth. These estimates are inconsistent with the argument that households are much more likely to move to new homes after realizing an increased value of home equity. In columns 3 and 4, respectively, we split the sample into homeowners that move and do not move zip codes between 2002 and 2006. The elasticity of debt growth with respect to house price growth is similar in both samples. Taken together, the estimates in Panel A are inconsistent with the argument that homeowners use borrowed money primarily to finance the purchase of new homes.
In Panel B, we examine whether homeowners use the increased value of home equity to buy investment properties. This may be a concern given that the percentage of households in the Survey of Consumer Finances that have outstanding debt on a residential property other than their primary residence increased from 4.6% in 2001 to 5.5% in 2007 (Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, and Moore (2009), Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003) ). While we do not have data on the purchase of investment properties, the consumer credit reports contain the number of mortgage accounts. Under the assumption that consumers must obtain a new mortgage to purchase an investment property, we should detect any systematic use of increased home equity to purchase an investment property by examining the number of mortgage accounts. Only retirement accounts increased slightly (52.2% to 52.6%). Conditional on having a financial asset, the SCF reports a decline in the median value of financial assets from $29.8 thousand to One additional fact is also inconsistent with the hypothesis that consumers use home equity-based borrowing to purchase financial assets. As we show in the next section, the home equity borrowing channel is stronger among low credit quality and high credit card utilization individuals. Evidence from the SCF suggests that participation among lower income and lower net worth individuals dropped even more dramatically than the average from 2001 to 2007.
The evidence is inconsistent with the argument that consumers borrowed against increased home equity to purchase real estate or financial assets. In Panel C, we explore whether consumers use increased home equity-based borrowing to pay down outstanding credit card balances. This is a useful exercise given that the mean interest rate on outstanding credit card debt is 12.5% according to the SCF (Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, and Moore (2009) ). If consumers do not pay down credit card balances, then it suggests that homeowners derive considerable marginal utility from the use of home-equity based borrowing.
Panel C isolates the sample to homeowners in the top quartile of the credit card utilization distribution as of 1997. The mean credit card balance outstanding among this group is almost $10 thousand and the mean credit card utilization rate (amount outstanding divided by the high limit) is 0.71. Column 1 shows an elasticity of home debt borrowing with respect to house price growth of 0.7 among this sample. Despite the large increase in home-equity based borrowing and the large amount of outstanding credit card balances, the estimates in columns 2 and 4 show that these individuals do not pay down credit card balances in response to house price growth. 9 While we cannot see the exact use of borrowed funds in our data, the results in Panel C suggest that the marginal return to the use of borrowed funds is quite high.
While we do not have direct data on real outlays by individuals, we are able to demonstrate that consumers do not use home equity-based borrowing to buy real estate or financial assets, and consumers do not use borrowed funds to pay down credit card debt with a high interest rate. While more evidence is needed, our findings are suggestive that a large fraction of home equity-based borrowing is used for consumption or home improvement. This conclusion is consistent with survey evidence by Brady, Canner, and Maki (2000) who find that from 1998 to 1999, 40% of households cite home improvement as a reason for home equity extraction, and 39% cite consumer expenditures. Using similar survey data, Canner, Dynan, and
Passmore (2002) find that over 50% of funds liquefied from home equity are used for either home improvement or consumer expenditures.
B. The Macroeconomic Impact of the Household Borrowing Channel
9 Ideally, we would want to examine outstanding credit card debt on which interest is being paid. However, the credit bureau only collects outstanding credit card balances. Several tests suggest that balances are strongly correlated with outstanding debt, especially among high credit card utilization individuals. Increases in credit card balances are strongly positively correlated with future default, and outstanding credit card balances are strongly negatively correlated with credit scores. Further, given that all of our tests are done in first-differences, any error in using balances instead of debt that is similar across housing supply elasticity is removed.
Since our estimates of the home equity-based borrowing channel is based on a representative sample of the U.S., we can integrate our estimated effect to compute the economy wide magnitude of home equity-based borrowing due to higher house prices.
How much of the increase in mortgage credit can be attributed to a direct effect of existing homeowners borrowing against the increasing value of their housing equity? We start with our baseline estimate of column 2 in Table II that suggests that homeowners increase their total borrowing by 0.5 percent for every 1.0 percent increase in house prices. Since our estimated effect is based on a difference in differences approach, the level impact of house prices on borrowing is not identifiable. Therefore, the appropriate in-sample aggregate effect of our estimate should be computed using relative differences in house price growth.
Let i index an MSA such that the MSAs are ordered by their housing supply inelasticity with i=1 being the most elastic. Let ∆ be the predicted percentage change in house prices for MSA i given its supply inelasticity. Given our home equity-based borrowing elasticity estimate of 0.6, the average percentage change in total borrowing due to the house price channel for homeowner living in MSA i is given by 0. 10 The sum of home equity-based borrowing over our regression sample is equal to $2.21 billion. Since our random sample has a sampling rate of 0.494%, and we dropped 18.3% of homeowners (dollar-weighted) due to early moves, the total effect in our sample of zip codes is: $2.21/(0.00494*(1-0.183))= $548 billion. The zip codes in our regression sample represent 26.5% of U.S. household credit in 2002. To estimate the home-equity borrowing channel effect for remaining zip codes not in our sample, we apply our home equity-based borrowing elasticity estimate of 0.5 to the house price appreciation for these zip codes. House price appreciation is measured using zip code level price estimate from zillow.com wherever possible, and using MSA level OFHEO price index otherwise. For 16.6% of dollar-weighted zip codes, we do not have any house price data and assume a home equity borrowing effect of 0 to be conservative. The aggregate home equity borrowing effect comes out to be $1.45 trillion.
The aggregate increase in debt due to house price appreciation represents 2.8% of GDP per year over the four years. While we do not have data on real outlays, our previous evidence suggests that it is likely that some of the borrowings are used for consumption and home improvement. If we take the extreme view that all of borrowed money is used for real outlays, then our estimate helps explain the drop in the savings rate during this time period.
IV. Does the Home Equity-Based Borrowing Channel Vary By Consumer Type?
Our estimates above suggest a large response of homeowner borrowing to increases in the value of home equity. In this section, we explore cross-sectional heterogeneity of the effect.
Our goal is to provide insight into the underlying model of consumer behavior that is most consistent with the home equity-based borrowing channel.
We first examine how the propensity to borrow against increased home equity varies by the homeowner's base year credit score and credit card utilization rate. Credit scores play an important role in the availability and pricing of consumer credit, and consumers below critical thresholds are often unable to obtain financing at reasonable interest rates. 11 Credit card utilization rate is measured by the fraction of the total available credit card limit that is used.
Credit scores and credit card utilization rates have a correlation coefficient of -0.88 in our sample of homeowners, and an OLS regression of one on the other yields an R 2 of 0.78. The literature on consumer credit often interprets low credit scores and high credit card utilization rates as indicators for liquidity constrained households (see Gross and Souleles (2002) ). However, such variables may also be systematically correlated with an underlying behavioral attribute of households such as self-control problems.
The top four panels of Figure 5 examine debt growth patterns for inelastic and elastic
MSAs by 1997 homeowner credit score and credit card utilization rate. We define "high" and "low" categories as the top and bottom quartile of the respective distribution. The top panel of Figure 5 shows a very strong home equity-based borrowing effect for low credit quality borrowers. In contrast there is almost no effect for high quality borrowers as both elastic and inelastic debt growth path are similar throughout the sample period. A similar pattern is revealed in the middle panel that uses 1997 credit card utilization to separate borrowers.
The top four panels of Figure 5 provide support for the exclusion restriction in our instrumental variables specification. The fact that there is almost no difference in borrowing between inelastic and elastic MSAs for high credit quality and low credit card utilization zip codes is inconsistent with a general non-housing related credit demand shift in inelastic MSAs.
An alternative channel for higher borrowing in inelastic MSAs must explain why the effect is absent in high credit score and low credit card utilization individuals.
As we discuss in Section II.A, a standard model without liquidity constraints hypothesizes that older consumers should be more willing to extract cash from the increased value of home equity. The bottom two panels of Figure 5 do not show evidence in favor of this hypothesis. We split the sample into consumers in the lowest and highest quartile of the age distribution, and we find that inelastic-elastic differential in debt growth is not significantly different for young and old homeowners. As equation (7) shows, the instruments in the first stage are housing supply elasticity and housing supply elasticity interacted with the relevant interaction variable listed at the top of the column in Table VIII . In column 1, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is negative, which implies that the effect of house price growth on home equity-based borrowing from 2002 to 2006 is lower for individuals with a higher 1997 credit score. The magnitude of the difference is large. For a consumer one standard deviation above the mean 1997 credit score, the elasticity of debt with respect to house prices is 0.28. For a consumer one standard deviation below the mean 1997 credit score, the elasticity is 0.70.
The positive estimate on the interaction term in column 2 implies that individuals with a high credit card utilization rate have a larger borrowing response to house price growth. The estimate implies that for a consumer one standard deviation below the mean 1997 credit card utilization rate, the elasticity of debt with respect to house prices is 0.29. For a consumer one standard deviation above the mean 1997 credit card utilization rate, the elasticity is 0.75.
The coefficient estimate on the interaction term is not significant for either sex or household income. The coefficient estimate on the age interaction term in column 4 is negative which suggests that the borrowing of older consumers is less responsive to house price growth than young consumers, which is inconsistent with standard life-cycle models of consumer financial behavior.
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V. Home Equity-Based Borrowing and the Financial Crisis
The evidence above shows the importance of the home equity-based borrowing channel during the U.S. housing boom. What role did the unprecedented increase in leverage for high house price growth homeowners play in the ensuing financial crisis? A unique advantage of our data set is that we can estimate the default rate implications of aggressive home equity-based borrowing when house price growth decelerates and turns negative.
The top panel in Figure 6 examines total debt default rates for 1997 homeowners in the highest and lowest quartile MSAs based on house price inelasticity. The corresponding increase in elastic MSAs is less than 4 percentage points.
Table IX presents estimates of the effect of house price growth on the change in default rates from 2002 to 2006. The instrumental variables specification in columns 1 and 2 is similar to the specification outlined in equations (1) and (2) above, except we examine default rates as the outcome variable. Consistent with Figure 6 , we find a negative correlation between default rates and house price growth from 2002 to 2006. The estimate in column 2 implies that a one standard deviation increase in house prices leads to a 1 percentage point decrease in default rates.
In columns 3 through 7, we examine how house price growth differentially affects the decline in default rates from 2002 to 2006 for different homeowners. The instrumental variables specification is similar to the specification outlined in equations (6) and (7) To obtain the macroeconomic magnitudes, we can repeat our analysis from Section III.B to examine the effect of house price appreciation on total defaults for the U.S. economy. Taking the estimate of 0.10 from column 1 of Table X , we find that defaults due to the home equitybased borrowing channel represent 34.8% percent of total new defaults in the U.S. economy.
This suggests that the current mortgage default crisis is not entirely driven by individuals buying into a rising housing market. A significant part of the default crisis is driven by existing homeowners borrowing heavily against the rising value of their house.
VI. Conclusion
We provide evidence of a strong link between asset prices and household borrowing decisions. The use of individual level data and an instrumental variables methodology enables us to estimate the magnitude of the home equity-based borrowing channel. Since our individual level data is representative of U.S. household sector, we can provide an estimate of the economywide effect of the rise in house prices on household borrowing during the period of strong house price growth from 2002 to 2006.
The macroeconomic estimate of the effect of house price on household borrowing is large. We also show evidence that the increase in homeowner borrowing is not used to buy new houses, buy investment properties, or pay down costly consumer debt. Taken together, these findings lend support to the view that home equity-based borrowing is used for real outlays.
While the effect of collateral on macroeconomic fluctuations has typically focused on business investment (Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ), our evidence suggests that fluctuations in house prices and household credit availability may play an important role in the evolution of business cycles. Exploring this link is an important question moving forward.
Our results also highlight the importance of understanding the microeconomic foundations of household behavior. We find that the home equity-based borrowing channel is driven primarily by homeowners with low credit scores and high credit card utilization rates.
This may suggest that house price appreciation allows previously credit-constrained homeowners to move toward their optimal level of borrowing and consumption. However, it may also imply house price appreciation provides greater access to borrowing for homeowners that suffer from behavioral biases such as adaptive house price expectations (Agarwal (2007) ), dynamically inconsistent preferences, or self-control problems.
Table I Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for 74,149 individuals who have either an existing mortgage account with positive balance as of 1997 or a previous mortgage account. The sample is further restricted to individuals that do not move zip codes between 1997 and 1999. Individuals are sorted into groups of at least 5 individuals. Each group consists of individuals living in the same zip code as of 1997, and the individuals are sorted by 1997 credit score before groups are formed. The income in the denominator of the debt to income ratio comes from zip level IRS data. The zip code level median home value as of 1997 comes from the 2000 value reported in the decennial Census multiplied by the growth rate from 2000 to 1997 reported in the Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss data. The housing supply elasticity measure we use is from Saiz (2010) . The Saiz (2010) This table presents estimates of the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the effect of house prices on household borrowing for individuals that have either positive outstanding mortgage debt as of 1997 or a previous mortgage account. In each column, we interact house price growth with the variable in the top of the column. The instruments in the first stage are MSA level housing supply elasticity and MSA level housing supply elasticity interacted with the interaction variable listed in the top of the column. In all columns, we use the data sorts that maximize variation in the interaction variable. More specifically, in columns 1 and 2 we utilize data sorted by credit score before groups are formed. In columns 3 to 6, we utilize data sorted by each interaction variable before groups are formed. All standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
(1) In columns 3 to 6, we interact house price growth with the variable in the top of the column. The instruments in the first stage are MSA level housing supply elasticity and MSA level housing supply elasticity interacted with the interaction variable listed in the top of the column. In all columns, we use the data sorts that maximize variation in the interaction variable. More specifically, in columns 3 and 4 we use the data sorted by credit score before groups are formed. In columns 5 to 7, we use the data sorted by each interaction variable before groups are formed. All standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) In columns 3 to 6, we interact house price growth with the variable in the top of the column. The instruments in the first stage are MSA level housing supply elasticity and MSA level housing supply elasticity interacted with the interaction variable listed in the top of the column. In all columns, we use the data sorts that maximize variation in the interaction variable. More specifically, in columns 3 and 4 we use the data sorted by credit score before groups are formed. In columns 5 to 7, we use the data sorted by each interaction variable before groups are formed. All standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Figure 2 House Price and Leverage Patterns, Inelastic versus Elastic Housing Supply MSAs
This figure presents house price, total debt, and total debt to income patterns for the top and bottom quartile MSAs based on housing supply elasticity from Saiz (2010) . The sample includes individuals with mortgage debt outstanding as of 1997 or with a previous mortgage account. .7
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